which in turn have exacerbated unprecedented forms of warfare inter-socially. The problem of modernity was never that of the problem of war as such, but in the still prevalent forms of solution to war. That is to say in the ways modern societies construe peace. Understood thus, the imperative question of politics, which he specifies more clearly in *"Society Must Be Defended"*, and which reiterates Fanon's original postcolonial critique, is that of how to disengage from the processes of subjectification by which life comes to be variably pacified and mobilised. What form does life take when it is no longer suborned to a modern teleology of peace achieved through the means of war? Yet, in detailing this imperative and posing this question, Foucault abandons us upon a word of prohibitive caution. Those many and long traditions of counter-opposing the imposition of peace by declaring it war, which find their culmination now in a multitude of 'dispersed and discontinuous' offensives, and among which he contextualises the thrust of his own earlier work, provide no substantial ground, he argues, from which to escape the peace/war schemata. If we desire a resolution of this fundamental paradox of political modernity we must establish other ways of construing the life of political being, ones which compromise its seemingly endless polemologies.

4

Security

A Field Left Fallow

Didier Bigo
Translated by J. E. Dillon

The publication in French in 2004 of the course of lectures delivered at the Collège de France in 1977–8 under the title *Security, Territory, Population* re-launched the discussion of the way in which Michel Foucault analysed security in relationship with the police, discipline and punishment on the one side, and with liberalism, risk and biopolitics on the other (Foucault, 2004b: p. 50). In addition, it took on a new dimension in the context of the discussion of the politics of counter-terrorism after 9/11 and the interpretation of the 'dispositifs of security' as exceptional dispositifs which suspended the rule of law and gave authority to the widening of police powers of surveillance.[1] Is it possible, starting from this series of lectures, now nearly 30 years old, to interpret differently the issues which surround security? How can we avoid the fetishism surrounding Foucault and make the text 'work'? What does this body of material have to say to us?

'Dispositifs of security' in the work of Michel Foucault

The 1977–8 course has, like its subject, a history with something of a whiff of sulphur about it. Often quoted by Foucault's biographers (Eribon, 1989; Florence, 1984; Gros, 2004; Zoungrana, 1998), as the moment of Michel Foucault's public hesitations, crisis of confidence, and need for a sabbatical year in order to rethink his project, the reading of this course was nevertheless for a long time the preserve of those brave enough to go and listen to the cassettes made at the time and deposited in the Saulchoir Library.[2] There were not many of them: a little circle of specialists in the study of political violence and of the police debating the thematic of security, territory and population which

were on the margin, compared with the discussions on knowledge–power relationships, psychiatric power, 'the abnormal' and on subjectivation which were considered to be central by the group surrounding Foucault and listening to the other courses. For a large majority of 'these initiates', the 1977 course appeared as a 'weak' one. It was analysed as a parenthesis between two central theses, one deriving from the punitive society, extending through the treatment of the *Abnormal*, through the ideas expressed in *"Society Must Be Defended"* and culminating in the polemics between Foucault and the Marxist authors on the concept of power after the publication of *Discipline and Punish*, the other emanating from *The Birth Of Biopolitics* and coming to completion with the *Hermeneutics of the Subject* and *The Government of the Self and the Others* (1977a, 1997, 1999, 2004a, 2005, 2008a). In the view of this narrow group of followers, still 30 years later, this course is marginal and embarrassing (Deleule and Adorno, 2000; Foucault and Gros, 2002).[3] It is not surprising that those who had the task of (re)editing the courses have preferred to publish first those of 1973, 1974, 1975, 1976 and 1978 before publishing the course of 1977. They said in order to justify this original order of publication that there was no necessity to argue with the critics about the weaknesses in the articulation of Foucaultian analysis between discipline and governmentality, before demonstrating the coherence of the work, better explained later on in 1980. The 1977 lecture had to be hidden, the more so, since the laconic resumé of the course favoured an interpretation which Foucault was to refute in his lectures by insisting on the fact that he was changing his track and subject, no longer working on security but on governmentality (Foucault, 1989).

However, it seems to me that these hesitations, distanced from Foucault's magisterial speech and certainty of tone, constitute, 30 years on, the retrospective interest of the course, and its productivity for analysing a present overwhelmed by the notion of security.

It is obvious from listening to and reading the 1977 course that Michel Foucault did not succeed in thinking out the logics of the functioning and transformation of security, and that this upset him. In contrast with the courses of other years, this course was not ready. The series of lectures of that university year was halting. The introduction of each session was aimed at plugging the gaps. But after four lectures Michel Foucault gave up. Security was not to be the object of his reflections for the whole year. That was to be governmentality, biopower, population and liberalism. It is this failure to analyse security as the concept articulating the relationships of territory and population, and bringing to completion sovereignty as the micro-physics of power, and the line of

flight which Foucault discovered, beyond sovereignty and discipline, concerning governmentality and biopower, as well as the tenuous bond which is made between security and governmentality that I would now like to begin to discuss.

I understand that the tendency to make the text sacred, in this case, the lectures, aims at covering the hesitations and that to speak of 'setback' or 'failure' will not be easily accepted by the followers. Some want a smooth narrative concerning the deployment of reason, and a good relationship between the books. They refuse to analyse the contradictions between *Discipline and Punish* and *Security, Territory, Population*. They refuse to analyse the gap between modern security dispositifs and pastoral power as a form of government, and they just insist on a tenuous continuity. However, Foucault was not fooled at the time by his own assertions, and we have to recognise the difficulties instead of masking them. The original intention was to have a series of three terms: sovereignty, discipline and security, in order to organise a triptych of strategic configurations disrupting the so-called essence of the state as sovereign and its transhistorical constituency will work only for the distinction between sovereignty and discipline. But, on security, Foucault was not able to produce the explanation of the discourses (episteme) and practices (strategies) which are specific to this third configuration. He will be obliged to abandon the idea of a modern move, after disciplinarisation reconfiguring discipline and sovereignty, called security. He cannot add this third 'layer'.[4] The more modern configuration called security or freedom of circulation is tied with the more ancient form of configuration of pastoral power. The genealogy of the state is not sufficient; what is needed is a genealogy of the forms of governmentality whose roots oblige a return to the Greeks and Romans, and not to begin with the 'classical age' of the sixteenth century. Security will be replaced by research on freedom of circulation and pastoral power, ending up with the notion of biopolitics. Only there is the possibility to analyse the transformations of both sovereignty and disciplinarisation.

The lectures of 11 and 18 January 1978

In the first lecture of the course Michel Foucault is optimistic and proposes hypotheses about the general features of security dispositif, and hopes to illustrate it through the treatment of leprosy, plague and smallpox.[5] But, as he goes along with his reflection, he refutes the difference he stated with sovereignty and discipline. The dispositif of

security is not sovereignty or the power to punish and to deliver death, but is nevertheless tied to it. It is, and it is not, about order, justice and punishment, which he has just studied. It is, and is not, about 'the police state' and its panopticon. It is, and is not, about discipline as it bears on the body of the individual. It is, and is not, about the regime of surveillance. It shares characteristics with these terms but, as with Lewis Carroll's *The Hunting of the Snark*, whenever one is about to grasp it, security turns out to be a 'boojum' (Carroll and Peake, 1941; Gardner and Carroll, 2006).

To try to grasp the difference between sovereignty and discipline, Foucault analyses security as a concept related to space and territory. He tries to link it to the basic biological features of the human species. But he insists that these statements of intent are not principles and that he does not want to do a 'general theory of what power is'. The security dispositif is a set of procedures, of strategic configuration different from others. The security dispositif emerges from the police state and its interventionism as a different way to manage population by 'laissez-faire', as a 'freedom of circulation'. Liberalism has a different relation to territory than the classical age of sovereignty and the disciplinary techniques of drawing closed boundaries. Liberalism is free from exerting control through territory; as it is brought into effect controlling populations through the articulation of security and liberty, and more precisely as the articulation of security as freedom of circulation. The security dispositif is also related to temporality, to the institution of prevention and to the future, as the key procedure is to predict statistically the number of thefts or crimes at a given moment, in a given society, in a given town, but what phenomenon is not related to this prediction? Are sovereignty and discipline unaware of the future? So, finally, the security dispositif is related to limits, to standard deviation, to averages.

This is the first line of thought to be followed in the lecture. Security is related to an order of calculation of probability, of statistical regularity (Foucault, 2004b: p. 8). Thus, the security dispositif cannot be analysed as being derived from a logic of exception or an exceptional situation. Security is related to normality and liberty, not with war and survival, nor with coercion and surveillance. It differs from sovereignty and discipline as it is a cost calculation inside a series of probable events. But, is it as such a different dispositif at work or only a procedure? Foucault poses no fewer than 13 questions attempting to define the specificity of this 'dispositif of security'. And one by one he abandons them. He does not himself think that an essence of a 'dispositif of security' can be discovered through 'a series of possible events referring to the temporal and the aleatory which it will be necessary to inscribe within a given space' (2004b: p. 22), or as 'a political technique which would be addressed to the environment' (p. 25). He believes that the given criteria differentiate between discipline and security, but are not capable of saying what precisely the latter is. Security is a form of contingency grasping different contents. Security is more a name than a dispositif articulating discourses and practices of a certain kind. Security reduced to uncertainty, to the aleatory and the probability calculus articulating legal and disciplinary mechanisms is not sufficiently coherent and has not the consistency of law or discipline.

He then envisages a second line of thought. Security is a feature of freedom of circulation. The key concept is freedom of circulation or freedom of movement as we say now. If sovereignty capitalises a territory raising the major problem of the seat of the government...if discipline structures a space and addresses the essential problem of a hierarchical and functional distribution of elements, security will try to plan a milieu in terms of events or series of events or possible events. It refers to the temporal and uncertain within a given space, a milieu. But the milieu is destabilised by the dynamic of security which is centrifugal and then it is always an open milieu. So, security is the product of a dynamic of openness and freedom. The appearance of security is a correlate of liberal economy and society. It is not a question of 'setting limits, frontiers...but, above all, in essence, of permitting, guaranteeing, ensuring circulations: of people, of goods, of the air' (Foucault, 2004b: p. 31 [author's translation]; 2007: p. 51 [in English]). It is not a matter of establishing frontiers, isolating a space, marking the boundaries and closing it off as was done by sovereignty and discipline but of constituting an 'environment of life' for populations, by opening, integrating and enlarging, all this implies a prior principle of liberty which must be connected with the calculus of probability so that the government may manage events to bring that environment dynamically into existence. Discipline is centripetal; the 'dispositifs of security' are centrifugal. Discipline concentrates, focuses and encloses. The first action of discipline is in fact to circumscribe a space in which its power and the dispositif of its power will function, and without limit. The dispositif of security in contrast is non-interventionist, it lets things happen and has a constant tendency to expand. It does not forbid. The law forbids, discipline prescribes, security regulates 'without prohibiting or prescribing, but possibly making use of some instruments of prescription and prohibition, by responding to a reality in such a way that this response cancels out the reality to which it responds – nullifies

it, or limits, checks, or regulates it' (Foucault, 2004b: p. 48; 2007: p. 72 [in English]).

Therefore, security imagines, but in a different way than law and discipline, as it tries to work within reality by getting the components of reality to work in relation to each other. However, if security exists and substitutes itself for the order of reality by becoming the simulacrum of reality, that is nothing other than what it declares itself to be. It can call itself liberty, protection, safeguard, survival, love, in making use of sovereignty and discipline. In that sense freedom is nothing else but the correlative of the deployment of dispositif of security and security is nothing else but the correlative of the deployment of freedom-capacity of circulation.

Foucault hesitates in front of the magnitude of the consequences of his thought that security nullifies freedom and can pretend to be freedom in an order of reality that Baudrillard calls simulacrum (Baudrillard, 1994). The opposition between security and freedom is meaningless as security works both ways in the liberal discourse, and is everything which is not contingency and accident. Foucault is uneasy with the result of this line of thought which helps his adversary on the polemic about the status of reality and prefers to retreat to a more familiar terrain: history (Baudrillard, 1977; Baudrillard and Lotringer, 1987). He stops speaking about the dispositif of security and speaks only of security under the form of a dispositif of 'liberal security', introduced in the eighteenth century, in relation to the emergence of the physiocratic vision of economy as a new body of knowledge. So far as it is a special dispositif linked to a 'capacity of circulation' which permits regulation and which functions as a technology of power only if liberty is a dimension of it. No matter how much he insists, that freedom is not a matter of ideology, that 'it is not properly, fundamentally, primarily an ideology, it is first of all and above all, a technology of power', he adds 'it is at any rate, in this way, that it can be read' (Foucault, 2004b: p. 50 [author's translation]; 2007: p. 75 [in English]). We are still in the representation, not in the simulation and nullification of the reality by the reality. The dispositif of security, renamed dispositif of liberal security, or liberal freedom of circulation encapsulates certainly more specific practices, but far from the notion of security in the sense given at the beginning concerning a probability calculus.

The lecture of 25 January 1978

The lecture of 25 January 1978 is crucial as it presents an alternative in order to avoid the trap of the previous lectures, by playing with the

notions of risk, danger and crisis. A dispositif of liberal security regulates freedom of circulation in a territory in expansion by centrifugal mechanisms dealing with event and population. But what is a population? Population is not people. Population is a statistical category, neither the individual as singularity, nor the people as a whole. So, when a dispositif of security deals with population, it establishes norms and categories, but does so statistically. As such, it leads again to an opposition with discipline (Foucault, 2004b: p. 57). Discipline classifies, establishes a division between the capable and the incapable. It breaks down norms and, from that, divides the normal from the abnormal. Disciplinary normalisation consists first of all in positing an optimal model that is constructed in terms of a certain result, and is thus fragile. It is more a normation than a normalisation. Security, on the other hand, normalises in a different way. It starts from cases, from their statistical distribution, from the differential risks posed by each case, from the probabilities of their occurrence and it determines whether they are more or less dangerous, whether they have a greater or lesser chance of occurring in reality. It shows dramatically that in its contrary aspect insecurity, or more precisely (in)security, there is only one and the same process: the norm is sought from the starting point of the most pronounced curves of the statistical distribution of danger which are labelled as abnormal. '[T]he operation of normalisation consists in establishing an interplay between these different distributions of normality and [in] acting to bring the most unfavourable in line with the more favourable' (Foucault, 2004b: p. 65; 2007: p. 93 [in English]) 'The norm is an interplay of differential normalities.[6] The normal comes first and the norm is deduced from it' (Foucault, 2004b: p. 65; 2007: p. 93 [in English]) This is normalisation. This is the result, not of a principle of division or prohibition, but of the effect of a relationship. So normalisation, in contrast with normation, is not of a frontier drawn from first principles, but rather principles that emerge from statistical devices. Foucault stresses the articulation of the security–insecurity process grounded on the phenomenon, not attempting to hinder it, or stop it, but, on the contrary, 'making other elements of reality function in relation to it, in such a way that the phenomenon is cancelled out' (Foucault, 2004b: p. 61; 2007: p. 88 [in English]), using as his example the relationship between smallpox and vaccination. However, it seems that Foucault is bewitched here by the effect of reality which is created without any recourse to external principles, and by the morphogenesis of the norm from differential normalities. He does not discuss the emergence as truth of this statistical reality normalising the event through the

reversible polarity of freedom and security. He will do so later on, but in this lecture he still believes, or is fascinated by, statistics.[7]

There lies a third line of thought: that security is based on risk. Foucault posits security in relation to a category of differential risk based itself on statistical distributions. He originates the 'dispositif of liberal security' from the new notions allowing new forms of interventions: case, risk, danger and crisis (Foucault, 2004b: p. 63; 2007: p. 91 [in English]). Brought together these notions set up the study of a 'population' in the statistical sense of the term, that is to say that population is neither understood as an effective totality (as in sovereignty and law) nor as the treatment of subjects one by one (as in discipline and surveillance). Security thus is not a form of war and is not a form of generalised surveillance. It is not a byproduct of the exception setting the norm, and even not a byproduct of the panopticon. It is not about the supervision of all by the sovereign's glance. It is about the production of a category, of a profile.

Doubt rises into hyperbole on this lecture. Foucault is now opposing the concomitant thesis of Foucault in *Discipline and Punish* where the organisation of modernity is put into effect through the rationality of the diagram of the panopticon. The audience is destabilised. Foucault suspends the reasoning which contradicts his book and affirms the contrary of what he previously explained concerning Bentham's innovation:

> The idea of the panopticon is a modern idea in one sense, but we can also say that it is completely archaic, since the panoptic dispositif basically involves putting someone in the centre – an eye, a gaze, a principle of surveillance – who will be able to make its sovereignty function over all the individuals' places within this mechanics of power. To that extent we can say that the panopticon is the oldest dream of the oldest sovereign ... on the other hand what appeared now, is not the idea of a power which would take the form of an exhaustive surveillance of individuals ... but the set of dispositifs which, for the government and those who governed, make relevant very specific phenomena which are not exactly individual phenomena ... although individuals featured in them in a certain way, and there are specific processes of individualisation.
>
> (Foucault, 2004b: p. 68 [author's translation]; 2007: p. 97 [in English])[8]

Processes of individualisation, that is to say, profiles drawn from statistical categories and differential risk, normalising and putting

under the ban certain cases rather than others, and finalising the criteria to discriminate between categories until each category is one unit only. But the uniqueness is not based on the person, but on the category he represents, and if it is not him, it may be his brother, its identity and subjectivity is not important for the process. Security is then not a disciplinary dispositif and is not surveillance or panopticon. Is security a different 'dispositif' based on risk and profiling of population, based on monitoring the future and the potential actualisation of the present? Have we escaped from the territory with the population as statistical category and not as people?

There was to be no reply. With some bad faith, Michel Foucault avoids the contradiction between its interpretations of security and of discipline as panopticon. And he says 'The government of populations is, I think, completely different from the exercise of sovereignty over the fine grain of individual behaviours. It seems to me that we have two completely different systems of power' (Foucault, 2004b: p. 68; 2007: p. 97 [in English]). The triptych has disappeared. Michel Foucault does not want to criticise his notion of discipline and surveillance and to develop the critical discussion of the relation between security and surveillance. Security is no longer his interest as such. It is too complicated to articulate security, surveillance, risk and discipline, and it may destroy his previous book called in French, remember, *Surveiller et Punir* but that he will agree to be translated as *Discipline and Punish*. More importantly perhaps than a contradiction in his thought between security and surveillance reduced to discipline in order to avoid contradiction with security as probability, Foucault had just noticed a new line of flight, which does not deal directly with security, but which is relevant for analysing the 'government' of populations, government which relies on statistics and risk. The relevant distinction with sovereignty and disciplinary dispositifs did not pass through the elaboration of a third 'security' dispositif, but through a more fundamental disruption of episteme, characterising the modern by difference with the classical age and its combination of sovereignty and discipline, that is the relationship with biopower at the very moment when population emerges as a problem, and as a problem for government. Population as a statistical category and the monitoring of its regulation demonstrate thus that government is more than sovereignty, more than reigning, more than *imperium* (Foucault, 2004b: p. 78). It has its roots in a pastoral power that Paul Veyne has discussed about the Romans, and at the same moment is foundational of modernity through the body of knowledge in constitution with the political economy of liberalism.[9]

The lecture of 1 February 1978

The fourth lecture begins with this theoretical and quite theatrical blow. 'In short, in the last lectures we were concerned with the establishment of the series security – population – government. I would now like to begin to make a bit of an inventory of this problem of government' (Foucault, 2007: p. 127). The horizon of the course is displaced, as Ewald, Fontana and Sennelart rightly indicate, *from the 'dispositifs of security' towards the history of governmentality.* The plan of the course has changed, and the objective of his research, too. It is no longer a question of analysing the series security–population–government, still less the initial series security–territory–population, the question now is to explore the new idea of *political governmentality as exceeding sovereignty* (Foucault, 2007: p. 111). Foucault now has Hobbes as his focal point. How to undermine the Hobbesian understanding of modernity which characterises so many narratives and associates sovereignty with security (Walker, 2002)? It is accepted by all analysts that this lecture of 1 February 1978 was to redefine Foucault's programme of work. In it he begins to move towards the themes which were to preoccupy him in all his subsequent books: the multiplicity of practices of government (government of self, government of souls, government of children, government of the state), the over-valuing of the problem of the state and the necessity of making a history of governmentality analysing the birth of biopolitics, the government of the living, subjectification, government of self and others (in brief, the courses from 1978 to 1984).

I do not wish to directly comment on these other lectures here, except to spot occasionally the recurrence of the term 'dispositif of security' as a sub-category of biopower and governmentality of the living, in so much as Michael Dillon has been able to show with brio in his work how security was subjected to governmentality and biopower in a more profound way than Foucault has imagined using these terms.[10] I will preferably concentrate on the 'orphans' of the Foucaultian thesis on the series security–territory–population, on those who seek to continue to investigate the relations between town, violence, security, surveillance and war, and who have remained unsatisfied with the take of Foucault concerning security in relation to discipline and surveillance, and I would like to finish by presenting my own hypothesis which attempts to pay attention to these questions which have been left on hold, have certainly matured and which are, in a sense, a field lying fallow that we can now plant again.

The 'dispositif of security' in research inspired by Foucault

Michel Foucault's work on security, although incomplete and complex, has suggested interesting lines for research which were partially exploited. The notion of 'dispositifs of security' has de facto disappeared from the agenda, as well as the link Foucault tried to establish between his idea of 'dispositif of liberal security' and the pastoral governmentality of others and the self. But the legacy on liberal governmentality as opposed to 'the police state', and on the question of risk, aroused the interests of his collaborators and major works have been undertaken.

They were developed by a whole series of authors, many of whom were in the close circle who had heard him in the Collège de France. One may refer to the works of François Ewald (1986), Michel Senelart (1989), Arlette Farge (Farge and Foucault, 1982), Michelle Perrot (Perrot *et al.*, 1980), Jacques Donzelot (1980; Donzelot *et al.*, 1980), Yves Charles Zarka (2000), Lucien Sfez (1973, 1988), Pierre Lascoumes (Artières and Lascoumes, 2004; Lascoumes, 1986, 2004) and Gérard Noiriel (1991, 2005) among the French, of Pasquale Pasquino (Heller and Pasquino, 1987), Giovanna Procacci (1993), Alessandro Dal Lago (1997), the group from the journal *Aut-Aut*, among the Italians, of Nikolas Rose (1989, 1996, 2005), Colin Gordon and Graham Burchell (Burchell *et al.*, 1991; Foucault and Gordon, 1980), and the journal Economy and Society among the English, and of Dreyfus and Rabinow (Dreyfus and Rabinow, 1983; Dreyfus *et al.*, 1984), among the Americans.

Policing and (ab)normalisation: the drawing of boundaries inside society

Concerning the relationship of security, territory and population, most Foucaultian authors will consider the question of space and the management of frontiers, whether in relation to the city and its essential quality of being urban in the sense of its being a *civitas,* or its relationship to citizenship and the management by the police of its circulation and its garbage. Analysis of the margins of a social group is to be taken in its whole amplitude, but above all as a process of exclusion, of abnormalisation.

Michelle Perrot stressed immediately, like Gérard Noiriel a little later, the fact that security was put in place by means of statistical regulation. 'Insecurity' was defined as that which was deviant, rare, that which was on the margins of classified practices, 'security' was the name given to

the practices of a majority. The 'tyranny of the national' is to be read into the marginalisation of the refugee and the constitution of Frenchness in nationality as citizenship. The majority of a particular class of the population felt itself secure, independently of its ethical practices, in so far as deviance was abnormalised as infringing order and thence became criminal behaviour, that is on the one side, while on the other, policing was concentrated on the margins and turned a blind eye to the practices of the majority.

Hélène l'Heuillet will later discuss the police in the general sense of the administration of life and its reduction to garbage, covering the abnormal, the eye of power and forms of surveillance (L'Heuillet, 2001). Arlette Farge at the historical level will show how police is not only a question of the sovereign glance, but also of families. Policing is then different from the exercise of sovereign power. Jacques Donzelot will analyse this phenomenon of policing concerning contemporary families (Donzelot, 1980). Robert Castel, in a less Foucaultian language, will speak of exclusion and analyse its relationship with urban segregation, providing a strong account of this abnormalisation of the margins inside a society beyond policing by police forces (Castel, 1995). Jacques Rancière will raise in another way the boundaries (shores) of the political and the struggles for the extension of democracy, aiming to counter the abnormalisation of those on the margins (Rancière, 1990, 1995). And he will oblige a certain left, obsessed with revolution as the essence of the political, to come back to the discussion of the relation between the political and democracy, even representative democracy. The later Foucault will accept the argument, but the Foucault of 1978 was certainly opposed to this vision of Rancière where freedom and mobilisation of the 'without voices' can be active principles, not embedded into techniques of power (Aradau, 2004a; Rancière, 1990, 1995). The question of emancipation is raised. Resistance is not independent from power relations, but is it the case of freedom? What are the forces which redraw the boundaries of citizenship? Is it the dynamic of resistance of the excluded, or the centrifugal dynamic of security which normalises those which were abnormals?

Numerous criminologists (Ericson, Hagerty, Sheptycki) have discussed the construction of deviance along that line of thought, through the analysis of discourses on the excluded, showing how the association of deviance and criminality allows the extension of exceptional police practices in respect of football supporters, drug users, radical nationalists, immigrants and young people. The social acceptance of such practices is related to the fact that they are not perceived as detrimental

to fundamental liberties because the majority of citizens does not recognise themselves in these marginal groups (Ericson and Haggerty, 1997, 2000; Sheptycki, 2002). The security of citizens is understood in political terms as the security of the majority and the negation of security for those on the margins who disturbed the feeling of homogeneity among 'good' citizens. Anastassia Tsoukala, in her work on hooligans, showed, for example, how football supporters as a category were at first associated with a benign deviance then, more and more, with delinquency, justifying from then on the adoption of special police measures in dealing with them (Tsoukala, 2002).

For these criminologists, specialists of policing or philosophers, security is related to the population, it is a question of 'internal' security, not a question of 'external security', of war and survival (Bigo, 2002b). But if it is not war it is nevertheless the rumble of battle, and in a Foucaultian sense, war is just a normal account of life which is transformed by euphemism into struggles by politics (Chevallier, 2004; Foucault, 1997).[11] So the surprise is only for the specialists of international relations and their neo-Hobbesian agenda. Here securitisation, or more precisely (in)securitisation, is a form of contingency, the result of freedom and capacity of circulation.[12] And securitisation makes potentially the totality, the people as a whole, insecure by developing the category of risk, danger and death as a normality, but actually targets only margins. So security produces insecurity. It excludes in the name of protection and always discriminates within society. It abnormalises the margins and creates boundaries within the social space (Bigo, 2006b).

Following Foucault, for all these researchers, security is not the result of a system of logic of exception or of an exceptional moment of emergency in which normality is suspended and in which the rule is determined by the exceptional event. It does not have its origin in something above and beyond politics transforming the system of action and favouring coercive solutions. It is the result of a process which relies on the statistical majority of a class of events, of a statistical population. Abnormalisation is derived from constituting statistical regularity and classifying procedures which distribute events into particular categories, whether categories recognised by knowledge systems or common categories labelled by bureaucracies of the state. Normalisation is not carried out through some principle of division but through statistical distribution. It is related to the life environment and the management of the margins, not to the coercive control of a sovereign frontier or of an extraordinary political decision. This is particularly delicate to apply

in regimes where the rules of law are supposed to be applied and a voice should be given to the opposition, on the condition that it should not have recourse to arms. The question in democracy is that of the boundary between the majority and the margins in the very centre of the life environment, and of the forms of resistance and struggle which are played out there. The rumble of battle may also make itself heard within the boundaries of the state. Security lives in the struggle and insecurities of the margins. It is relational. It does not depend on decisions taken at a given moment. Foucault is opposed in every point to Schmitt and his opposition to Hobbes is hinted at throughout.

It is a cornerstone for the interpretation of the course. The question of security as it relates to war, and to international war, is not really discussed by Foucault and the Foucaultians. The split between security and war remains rather deep, with the exception of the recent work of Frédéric Gros (2006), and one ought to question why this is so. Is it something which has been forgotten, a *lacuna*? It is certainly not so. Foucault is not in any way unmindful of war. He refers to it frequently, and reversed the Clausewitzian formula of war as the continuation of politics by other means. Politics is a continuation of war, of struggle. Is it possible then, thanks to security, to see an end to struggle and war, civil war and strife? Is this a way to achieve social peace? Does it imply a superior force capable of putting an end to strife and violence? At no point does Foucault accept the theodicy of the state concerning the protection of the frontiers of the people, the creation of a homogeneous, common space and its counterpart of individual security resulting from the renunciation by the individual of his own sovereignty by delegating it to some Leviathan or other. This fairytale, for adults and professors of political science, has no interest for him. The charge against Hobbes is central. Hobbes is a liar. The violence of the state is not security, even though it pretends to be so. He does not even bother to recall it. What remains is the brutal power of delivering death, with its routines of invasion and subordination. The idea of the state as a protective force, a primary consideration for classical realists and liberals in international relations theory, does not appear, except perhaps as a simple claim of sovereignty.

In taking this stance, Michel Foucault is then refusing to associate security with the exception, with survival, with the prospect of war, with 'external' security. He avoids associating individual security (safety) and the security of the state (survival) against external aggression. So, for many Foucaultians, security is of the nature of the microphysics of power and resistance. It is the effect of a system of liberties

and in that it differs from sovereignty and discipline. It does not come only from the state. When the state declares a state of exception or emergency, it is not the enactment of a security claim or practice, but its end. Security is disembodied from freedom and reduces to techniques of discipline and sovereignty. In that sense, as we will see, 9/11 is not the start of a hypersecurity era (Bothe *et al.*, 2005; Harvey, 2004). On the contrary, it signifies the death of the security era, and of any idea of protection. It creates a different articulation between sovereignty, surveillance and discipline, and security cannot be read only as liberal freedom of circulation.

Security as freedom of circulation within a life environment: centrifugal dynamic

As we have seen, a major argument for Foucault is that a dispositif of security cannot exist without a regime of liberties, and in particular without freedom of circulation. Security pre-supposes that one analyses mobilities, networks and margins instead of the frontier and the isolation that goes with demarcation. Security is thus a dispositif of circulation within a life environment and not a dispositif of disciplining bodies. A security dispositif does not isolate, it is built as a network. It does not close off the social area but interweaves its aspects. It does not operate so as to watch and maintain surveillance, it lets things happen (as a form of laissez-faire). Specialists on European institutions have to question themselves about this dimension where freedom of circulation produces a normality, a security which destabilises disciplinary closures and sovereign logics, and thus creates unease about the lack of certainty (Apap, 2001; Gangster *et al.*, 1997; Huysmans, 2004a; Kelstrup and Williams, 2000). They are often unaware of the Foucaultian approach and its idea of centrifugal dynamic, and see the phenomenon through the lenses of a spillover, but much research concerning the frontiers of Europe can profit from Foucault's lectures. What is often not accepted is the effect this line of thought has on freedom. The proposition overturns the conventional schema of the balance between two different principles: security and freedom (Bigo *et al.*, 2006a). Security is not the opposite of liberty. It is not an equivalent principle. It is not even the delineation of the limits of liberty or a form of necessity. It is the result of liberties. Security works in a given area and favours the double movement of extending the area and freeing circulation. In fact, within the interplay of opposing forces, security is extended by displacing frontiers, pushing back

controls on others, externalising discipline so as to maintain securitisation only in the name of the liberty of the majority (Bigo and Guild, 2005; Valluy, 2005).

I have analysed this process of (in)securitisation linked with the constitution at the transnational level of a group of professional managers of unease and the creation of a dispositif of ban, normalising the statistical majority and abnormalising the migrants (Bigo, 2002a, 2006c). I have proposed the terminology of a continuum of (in)security to allow an understanding of issues of legitimacy linked with the transfer of derogatory practices and special techniques of enquiry from the areas of the struggle against terrorism and drugs to the areas of struggle against clandestine immigration, control of frontiers and the movement of people. It is a question here of refusing to accept the abnormalisation of those on the margins which constitutes the security of the statistically normalised majority and of understanding the centrifugal dynamic producing an unlimited (in)security (Bigo, 1996).

In this sense, Zygmunt Bauman, with the concept of liquid modernity, was to follow this approach developed in the course of 1977 by Michel Foucault (perhaps without knowing it?), by paradoxically criticising Michel Foucault's book *Discipline and Punish*, and more especially on the idea of the panopticon (Bauman, 2000).[13] From his point of view Foucault saw only discipline and control, but circulation has the first place. It generates liberties and exclusion. Circulation in a system of liberties does not only encourage mobility, it also seeks to impose it. In a very similar vein to Foucault's second lecture, Bauman develops a critique of *Discipline and Punish* to insist on freedom of circulation as the key factor in explaining globalisation.

> This globalisation is as much a divisive factor as one which unifies and what appears to some as a sign of a new liberty is imposed on many others as a cruel fate. Mobility reaches the first rank of desirable values, and liberty of circulation which has always been a rare and unequally shared advantage rapidly becomes the principal stratifying factor of the modern and post-modern periods... We are all shifting through taste or pressures... some among us are becoming completely globalised, others are fastened firmly in their own localities. However, to exist locally in a globalised universe is a sign of degradation and social dispossession. An important part of the process of globalisation is nothing other than the segregation, separation and exclusion of space.
>
> (Bauman, 1998: p. 22)

Here we are again in this process of abnormalisation of the margins in a dynamic environment produced by technologies of freedom. And in this environment the security dispositif matches not with a statistical majority but with an imagined majority projected into the future as an inexorable form of reality. Bauman is more clear than Foucault on this point. Security imagines the future and projects itself into it as a maximal form which has reduced the margins to non-existence; it makes a fantasy of homogeneity and seeks the end of any resistances or struggles, but then security is surveillance through technologies monitoring the future and is different from disciplinarisation. Surveillance is not an equivalent of discipline. Foucault has not understood that surveillance joins what he has disjoined by differentiating security on one side and discipline on the other side. Gary Marx, David Lyon and I have prolonged this hypothesis of security as a temporal marker of mobility, emerging as a function of policing at a distance in space and time (Bigo *et al.*, 2006b; Lyon, 2002; Monahan, 2006). Surveillance studies have a better take on security than traditional security studies and orthodox Foucaultian criminology following *Discipline and Punish*. Security becomes digital and follows up traces left by everything which moves (products, information, capital, humanity). By dematerialising through data information-gathering, a security dispositif not only acquires a speed that transcends borders, but also an ambition to monitor and control the future through profiling and morphing. Elspeth Guild and I have shown it at work on European frontiers, on the development of databases with biometric identification, and on forms of long-distance policing through visas, so that the constitution of profiles of individual suspects as a statistical population category could resemble future developments (Bigo, 2005; Bigo and Guild, 2005). Philippe Bonditti has put forward the recent transformation of American security and the tension between the disciplining of the homeland through controlling the frontiers and the securing of cyberspace (Bonditti, 2004; Ceyhan, 2004). Ayse Ceyhan and Sylvia Laussinotte have developed the same approach at the European level (Ceyhan, 2006). Jef Huysmans has connected this relationship of mobility with the notion of risk, as have Claudia Aradau and Rens Van Munster (Aradau, 2004b; Aradau and van Munster, 2007; Bigo, 2002a, 2006a; c.a.s.e. collective, 2007; Huysmans, 2004b, 2005). This range of research has explored the notion of governmentality by anxiety and unease, at the same time the authors refuse the idea of a fear-based politics instrumentalised by governments and bring onto contemporary agendas the relationship of links between mobility, security and

risk. The liberal dispositif of security is then a dispositif of freedom of circulation imposing mobility on the majority and sorting out those who are banned and detained before being sent back. These abnormals detained in camps around airports and frontiers are not *Homo sacer* waiting for death. Guantanamo hides the everyday practices of detention at the boundaries of democracies. The people there are in a dispositif (the so-called waiting zone has replaced the prison) with the 'freedom' to leave to where one does not want to go, in a dispositif of endless circulation, of constant rotation manufacturing a satellite population and stopping, detaining people for the management of efficient information, before obliging them to 'run' again (Bigo, 2007a). This dispositif transformed the relationship of innocence and habeas corpus when 9/11 created a fear of the worst-case scenario, as it has turned into a 'pre-crime' approach in which the police try to anticipate the actions of categories of population profiled as would-be criminals. Policing is not only at a distance but at dis-time: a move combining differently sovereignty, surveillance and security.

Security as governmentality through risk; but what form of risk?

If the security dispositif is linked with the majority category of a statistical population and results from a system of relationships founded on liberties and mobility engendering a dynamic destabilisation of closed frontiers and generating exclusions through the abnormalisation of the margins, and if security is linked to the monitoring of the future, then the notion of security is closely linked to that of risk, but to a form of risk which is not necessarily studied in the logical processes of insurance.

The Foucaultian literature which has burgeoned after the course *Security, Territory, Population* is linked with this idea of risk and insurance, with the notion of the welfare state, and with the notion of the governance of uncertainty in liberal governmentality. The reflections of English authors at grips with a Thatcherism and Blairism engaged in the destruction of the pastoral rationality of the welfare state were to accentuate the bond proposed by Foucault between statistical rationality, risk, security and governmentality in his fourth lecture. Nikolas Rose was to rely strongly on the works concerning security, territory and population, above all so that he could develop the notion of liberal governmentality with very little relationship to security (Rose, 1993, 1999). For him, liberalism is a governmental formula, not a political

philosophy, nor a type of society. What matters is to think 'beyond the state', to analyse the arts of government and most particularly emergent neo-liberalism (Dean, 1999). We know the contribution and importance of the *Economy and Society* group. It is practically a new Foucault, immersed in the Anglo-American waters which have been diffused out of France. The notion of liberal governmentality was to give rise to numerous controversies and to influence many authors, even some of the most traditional, supporting as it does the approach to power as 'an action taken upon an action' (Nye, 1990). Liberalism optimises this way of managing populations through the perpetuation and increase of the living.[14]

François Ewald in his work on the welfare state and Jacques Donzelot's work on the invention of the social sphere, as well as Giovanna Procacci's on governing extreme poverty, were to influence profoundly the analysis of security as a form of liberal governmentality, putting the emphasis on the management of life and the social sphere, by means of a relationship differing from responsibility. It was around insurance and social security, around the notion of a welfare state, that the debate was to take place. Ewald defined risk as a form of solidarity, then more recently as a form of responsibility. The existence of risk is thus an element indissociable from modern life, inseparable from the idea of taking decisions and freedom of choice. Risk can be interpreted as danger or opportunity, but if it is understood as danger it is then mutualised. The calculation of risk is concerned with probability and based on the management of anxieties as well as on statistical regularity. However, such a calculation implies a certain degree of foresight about the future so as to establish tendencies permitting the anticipation of the consequences of a danger if it becomes real, and also a certain idea of the probability of its happening during a certain period of time. It is a question of reducing uncertainty by statistical calculation.

However, Ewald's thesis ended in ambiguity. The critical dimension tended to turn itself into a justification of a particular form of liberalism, combining security and liberty. The incisive view of Foucault on the normalisation of the majority is more or less forgotten. The managerial order took the upper hand in the name of regularity itself.

Elsewhere, there is a second criticism of the theory of insurance risk. For many researchers, insurance no longer produces the same effects in the period that Ulrich Beck characterises as the second modernity (Beck and Ritter, 1992; Larner and Walters, 2004). Today, the consequences of our decisions, going so far as to endanger the existence of

life on this planet, have become, he tells us, 'uncontrollable, unpredictable and incommunicable' (Beck, 2006: p. 355). The worst-case scenario does not respond to the mutualisation of risk and the working out of a series of events. It has no limit other than the political imagination of those who express it. As many authors indicated the risk is no longer of a 'dangerous but calculable accident', it has become incalculable, above all when it leads to the strategic decision to destroy and goes outside the natural order. It is difficult to think of catastrophe so destructive that the only solution is to prevent it from happening even once, insists Jean Pierre Dupuy (2002, 2004). Insurance risk calculation pre-supposes uncertainty brought under control by calculations of probability and forms of mutualisation of risk, while the dynamic of liquid modernity destroys both spatial frontiers and time limits necessary for probabilities. And if statistics can adapt to a global space, they are obliged to foresee a future without major catastrophe. The dynamic of insecurity is that security provokes forms of annihilation of frontiers which transform the world into its very own world frontier and invents new lines, new limits as indicated by Rob Walker (Walker, 2009). It introduces through its relationship to the future and its will to master it, to reduce it to a 'past future', to avert any 'insecure' event that may happen, any uncertainty, any major exceptional occurrence, and it re-introduces war and discipline to the heart of security. Risk is no longer thenceforth rationalised by insurance. A worst-case scenario cannot be mutualised, except by accepting the idea of *durée*. Insurance can cope with catastrophe but not with Armaggedon. Surveillance and discipline are then necessary to reconstruct the illusion of a capacity of protection against the unknown, against the atomic bomb in a backpack. Unlimited security by unlimited surveillance and perpetual war is the new rationale which destroys the idea of security as safety and protection, and the idea that security is linked with an insurantial approach.

One can also see the resurgence of arguments about exception and urgency, the state of necessity and dispensation, so that the occurrence of a single event may be avoided, with the focus set on the future only and on the imagination necessary to assure security. Giorgio Agamben and Michael Dillon have developed the connection between an imagination of risk, a form of biopolitics and a theory of exception. It is thus clear that the line of thought derived from insurance is not enough to consider the relationship between risk and security, as the worst-case scenario leads in itself to a form of astrology hiding behind belief in the technical capacity of exchanges of information and the capacity to establish profiles anticipating the actions of those who would produce the worst case.

Is it possible then to link thinking on security as a form of exception and as a form of regularity, as a rare event from somewhere beyond politics and as a banality in the practices of logic? Is it possible to analyse the relation between security, discipline and surveillance?

If (in)securitisation is based on statistical normality, routines, it is a different process from the implementation of exceptional political and juridical measures. These measures are certainly important as the markers of internal frontiers established by a society between itself and its own margins, but they are not, in any way whatsoever, foundational as the interpretations of Giorgio Agamben or the reflections of Barry Buzan and Ole Wæver seem to say by associating securitisation and exception (Agamben, 2003; Buzan, 2002). But if security is a governmentality of risk and risk is now associated with a worst-case scenario beyond any calculus of probability and a quasi-astrological assessment of the future, then any contingency read as an accident, a major catastrophe, a possible Armageddon, re-enacts the argument of the exception inside the risk approach.

We are not certain that it is possible to reconcile 'exception thinking', like that of Giorgio Agamben, or securitisation-as-survival which Buzan advocates, and beyond all that the whole Hobbesian form of thinking, with the Foucaultian approach to security, territory and population which places the emphasis on security as norm. There is a profound tension between the two approaches. At the same time, Foucault makes his task easier by distinguishing between security, sovereignty and discipline, and by placing the relationship of struggle and violence outside the analysis of security.

If struggle and war are a normality in politics, how can the normality of security be constituted except by integrating a certain form of struggle and violence? It is necessary at a given moment to believe in the symbolic inversion of violence as a force for peace and protection so as to constitute the framework of the security environment, and it is essential that the state should guarantee liberalism. This alchemy according to which the violence of the state (or the strongest) puts an end to violence and is then transmuted into peace and protection cannot be so easily put aside. It is not only the order of sovereignty and its declarations. It is not, or is not uniquely, the result of applying discipline to bodies. It is important to see the relation to democracy and freedom as active principles. The discourses and practices of protection must be taken seriously.

We also certainly need to come back to the relation between security and discipline after 9/11, and to analyse practices of surveillance (as well as the rhetoric of the war on terror) as a combination of these two strategic configurations and their reframing in what I have called a Ban-opticon (Bigo, 2007a, 2007b).

5

Revisiting Franco's Death

Life and Death and Biopolitical Governmentality

Paolo Palladino

In *Discipline and Punish* (1991b) Michel Foucault famously characterised the emergence of the modern state as the displacement of the classical sovereign's power to punish transgression by more dispersed governmental mechanisms which aimed instead to discipline and enhance the productive powers of the political subject. In *The History of Sexuality* (1990), Foucault expanded on the theme, emphasising the manner in which this distinctively modern deployment of power focused particularly on the subject in his or her factical, biological existence. As Foucault put it:

> For millennia, man remained what he was for Aristotle: a living animal with the additional capacity for a political existence; modern man is an animal whose politics places *his existence as a living being in question*.
>
> (1990: p. 143)

The ominous connotations of this biological redefinition of political subjectivity are more fully articulated, and problematically so, in Foucault's contemporaneous lectures at the Collège de France, now collected and translated as *"Society Must Be Defended"* (Foucault, 2003b). In the last of these lectures, Foucault argues that maximising the biological potential of the modern political collective requires 'purification', or, in other words, the elimination of that which might contaminate this 'biopolitical' collective. The classical, sovereign power to punish infraction of the law by killing the transgressor thus resurfaces as a supplement of modern, biopolitical governmentality, this time in the